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Itaipu’s Forgotten History: the 1965 Brazil-Paraguay Border Crisis  
and the New Geopolitics of the Southern Cone 
 
Jacob Blanc 
 
 
 On March 21, 1965, a group of nearly 100 Paraguayans gathered along the shores of the 
Paraná River, the waters of which marked the physical border with neighbouring Brazil. Among 
this contingent were high-ranking figures from the Stroessner dictatorship, various government 
authorities, and a large group of school children. In the shadow of the majestic Guaíra waterfalls, 
they proceeded to raise the Paraguayan flag, sing the national anthem, and give rousing speeches 
about the pride and sovereignty of their nation.1 The choice of location reveals the visit’s true 
purpose, as this region had been a heavily disputed frontier zone for nearly a century. In 
response, Brazil sent its own detachment of soldiers to occupy the exact same spot and in late 
October arrested a group of Paraguayan officials. This cascading series of events embroiled 
Brazil and Paraguay in a fifteen-month geopolitical standoff. After a procession of diplomatic 
exchanges, threats, and battles of public opinion and popular mobilisation, the border standoff 
was eventually settled on June 22, 1966 with the signing of the Act of Iguaçu.2 This agreement 
was the first official step toward what would become the Itaipu dam, at the time the largest 
hydroelectric plant in the world. 
 At its core, this conflict was about territorial sovereignty in the Guaíra region: what were 
the limits of the international border, how did it divide the waters of the Paraná River and its 
famous waterfalls, and who had the right to redraw its boundaries. These issues had existed since 
the late 19th century, but it was only in the 1960s that these questions of topography and 
                                                 
1 The region is spelled Guaíra in Portuguese, and Guairá in Spanish; this article will employ the 
former. 
2 This was known as the Ata das Cataratas in Portuguese, and the Acta de Iguazú in Spanish. 
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geographic demarcation resulted in a prolonged geopolitical crisis. Although scholars agree that 
this was the period in which Brazil emerged as the major power in the Southern Cone, they have 
yet to fully acknowledge the Guaíra conflict’s central role in Brazil’s ascent. Given this 
historiographic oversight, we must ask how a territorial dispute in a long-ignored border region 
helped change the geopolitical landscape of the Southern Cone. What were the underlying 
factors of the border crisis? How did they reflect shifting alliances, both within the region and 
with the United States? And in a decade of seemingly constant regime changes in Latin America, 
why did the Guaíra affair take place when it did, and what does its timing reveal about the 
emergence of a new political era? 
 This article will argue that the Guaíra border conflict was a catalyst for Brazil’s rise to 
power. With the backing of the United States, Brazil’s military regime refused to recognize 
Paraguay’s historical claim to the frontier zone. Although the Paraguayan government did 
benefit from entering Brazil’s sphere of influence—through participation in a bi-national dam 
project—it could only do so on the terms stipulated by Brazil, one of its greatest historical rival. 
Brazil’s actions throughout the border standoff also served to marginalise Argentina, whose own 
borders lay downstream on the same Paraná River. Even before the 1965 saga began, Brazil had 
already begun to overtake Argentina as the region’s major power-broker, but the control of the 
Paraná’s hydroelectric potential helped entrench a new geopolitical hierarchy.3 
                                                 
3 Brazil’s geopolitical overtaking of Argentina began in the 1930s and accelerated in the 1940s 
when the government of Getúlio Vargas aligned the country with the United States in World War 
II. In exchange for Brazil’s war-time participation—its troops were sent to fight in Europe and 
the U.S. was allowed to build military bases in the nation’s northeastern regions—Washington 
then “extended loans and technical assistance for the national steel plant at Volta Redonda, [and] 
gave Brazil substantial Lend-Lease aid (three-fourths of the total to Latin America)[.]” Stanley 
E. Hilton, ‘The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945-1960: End of the Special 
Relationship,’ The Journal of American History, 198, 68(3): 600. For more on the changing 
relationships during this time between Brazil, Argentina, and the Unites States see also Stanley 
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The border crisis was also shaped by the context of the Cold War. Especially after the 
Cuban Revolution of 1959, Latin America was an important battleground of the global Cold 
War, and the United States initiated a number of programs intended to stem the tide of 
communism in the Western Hemisphere.4 These included public programs like the Alliance for 
Progress that incentivized moderate reforms, and also covert plans to put in power leaders who 
would defend U.S. interests.5 The dictatorships of Brazil and Paraguay saw themselves as 
important Cold War allies of the United States: each government framed its political legitimacy 
on a rigid brand of anti-communism, and both sent troops to support the U.S. invasion of the 
Dominican Republic in 1965—an action that Argentina never took. Although the U.S. 
government maintained a positive relationship with Paraguay, it considered Brazil its most 
important partner in Latin America, and thus saw Brazil’s growth as part of its own geopolitical 
vision. Development and industrialization were equally fundamental components of this Cold 
War discourse, as modernization was considered a necessary bulwark against radical insurgency. 
This was especially true in Brazil, where industrial development was a central pillar of the 
dictatorship’s Doctrine of National Security. And in Paraguay, General Stroessner sought to 
                                                                                                                                                             
E. Hilton, ‘The Argentine Factor in Twentieth-Century Brazilian Foreign Policy Strategy,’ 
Political Science Quarterly, 1985 100(1): 27-51.  
4 Within the large body of literature on the Cold War in Latin America, two newer works include 
Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold War, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); and 
Virginia Garras-Burnett, Mark Atwood Lawrence, and Julio E. Moreno (Eds.), Beyond the 
Eagle’s Shadow: New Histories of Latin America’s Cold War, (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 2013).  
5 For more on the Alliance for Progress and modernization theory, see Jeffrey F. Taffet, Foreign 
Aid as Foreign Policy: the Alliance for Progress in Latin America, (New York: Routledge, 
2007), and Michael Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation 
Building" in the Kennedy Era, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). For more 
on covert U.S. actions see Stephen G. Rabe, The Killing Zone: the United States Wages Cold 
War in Latin America, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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build a more industrialised nation that would earn the approval of the United States and its global 
allies.  
To fulfil these development goals, both military regimes looked toward the disputed 
borderlands and the untapped hydroelectric potential of the Paraná River. For the Brazilian 
regime, the Guaíra standoff was an exercise in geopolitical posturing. Despite its overwhelming 
political and economic strength, the Brazilian regime realistically foresaw that it would have to 
allow its smaller neighbour to participate in a bi-national development project. Yet the Brazilian 
government concealed its willingness to collaborate and it consistently strong-armed Paraguay, a 
strategy that allowed it to unilaterally dictate the terms of how Itaipu’s energy and wealth would 
be shared.6 Additionally, its advances in the frontier zone must be seen as an effort to gain access 
to Paraguay’s fertile eastern border region for Brazilian farmers known as “brasiguaios.” The 
Stroessner regime, for its part, was guided by a desire to consolidate political legitimacy and to 
become a stronger ally of the United States—even if it meant a rapprochement with Brazil. The 
border crisis occurred exactly one hundred years after the War of the Triple Alliance (1865-
1870), and Stroessner used the legacy of the war to resurrect the image of Brazil as an unjust 
invader. The Paraguayan regime’s efforts to deflect internal opposition toward an outside force 
were only partially successful, as popular dissent formed against both the Brazilian ‘invasion’ of 
the border, and Stroessner’s complicity in ‘selling out’ the Guaíra waterfalls. Even with this 
domestic tension, the government’s nationalist rhetoric meant that despite the concessions 
eventually made to Brazil, Stroessner could still claim the construction of a Paraná dam as a 
victory for the Paraguayan people. 
                                                 
6 Although Brazil and Paraguay technically shared equal domain to dam’s energy, the 1973 
Treaty of Itaipu stipulated that Paraguay had to sell its unused portion of energy exclusively to 
Brazil at a price that was fixed for 50 years and far below market value. 
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The timing of the border conflict was particularly significant for the shifting power 
dynamics of the Southern Cone. Paraguay had been ruled by the Stroessner dictatorship since 
1954, and by the mid-1960s the government had begun to move the country away from its 
traditional alliance with Argentina (its neighbour to the west) in favour of Brazil (its neighbour 
to the east). Brazil, meanwhile, had just seen the overthrow of democratically elected João 
Goulart in April of 1964. The new military regime was determined to transform the country into 
a global player, and manoeuvred to overtake its Latin American neighbours for regional and 
hemispheric power. Argentina, whose borders lay downstream on the same Paraná river, was 
worried that a Brazil-Paraguay dam upstream would limit its own energy and commercial 
interests. In the early 1960s Argentina was governed by two reformist presidents who pushed 
back against certain U.S. interests, meaning that during the Guaíra crisis it was the only country 
that could not count on the support of the United States.7 Argentina’s major backlash against 
what would become the Itaipu dam did not take place until the 1970s—when it repeatedly 
denounced Brazil in front of the United Nations—but the origins of this river-rivalry were 
fortified in the 1960s. Propelled by these competing political regimes, the 1965-1966 border 
conflict helped Brazil supplant Argentina as the region’s major power. 
The foundational Treaty of Itaipu would not be signed until 1973 and the dam did not 
begin to produce electricity until 1984. Yet its long-term impact was first set in motion in the the 
context of the 1960s Cold War. Itaipu has since become a central vehicle for the development of 
both countries: the dam currently provides over 90% of all energy in Paraguay, and has been 
                                                 
7 The role of the Frondizi (1958-1962) and Illia (1962-1963) presidencies in Argentina are 
explained on pages 12 and 13 of this article. 
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cited as a key driver of Brazil’s ascent as the most powerful nation in Latin America.8 Despite 
Itaipu’s importance, almost no attention has been given to its bellicose beginnings. This makes it 
all the more necessary to explore the tense history that paved the way for what was widely 
referred to as ‘the project of the century’.  
 Existing literature on the 1965 border conflict is relatively thin. Although no studies have 
yet to focus explicitly on this history, various works do reference the Guaíra standoff in relation 
to other processes, including the presence of Brazilian farmers in eastern Paraguay9; Stroessner’s 
relationship with Brazil10; the political history of the Paraná River11; and the role of Itaipu in 
Paraguay’s national security regime.12 Although each work centres on an aspect of the border 
crisis, they make little attempt to see how the above-cited threads are part of a single, mutually 
constructed narrative. Additionally, a number of political figures in both Paraguay and Brazil 
produced first-hand accounts written during the crisis13, and memoirs afterwards.14 These books 
contain intimate details on inter-governmental relations, yet they are constrained by the same 
                                                 
8 Nilson Monteiro, Itaipu, a luz. (Curitiba: Itaipu Binacional, Assessoria de Comunicação Social, 
2000), pp. 10. 
9 R. Andrew. Nickson. ‘Brazilian Colonization of the Eastern Border Region of 
Paraguay’. Journal of Latin American Studies. 1981, 13 (1): 111-131. 
10 Alfredo da Mota Menezes. La herencia de Stroessner: Brasil-Paraguay, 1955-1980. 
(Asuncion, Paraguay: Carlos Schauman, 1990). 
11 Maria Regina Soares de Lima. The Political Economy of Brazilian Foreign Policy: Nuclear 
Energy, Trade, and Itaipu. (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, Brasília, 2013) 
12 Christine Folch. ‘Surveillance and State Violence in Stroessner’s Paraguay: Itaipú 
Hydroelectric Dam, Archive of Terror’. American Antropologist 2013, 115 (1): 44-57. 
13 Marco Antonio Laconich. La cuestion de limites en el Salto del Guairá. (Asunción, Paraguay: 
La Colmena S.A., 1964); Leopoldo Ramos Giménez. Sobre el salto del Guairá al oido de 
America. (Asunción, Paraguay, Anales del Paraguay, 1966). 
14 Edgar L. Ynsfrán. Un giro geopolítico: el milagro de una ciudad. (Asunción, Paraguay: 
Instituto Paraguayo de Estudios Geopolíticos e Internacionales, 1990); Mario Gibson 
Barboza. Na diplomacia, o traço todo da vida. (Rio de Janeiro, RJ: Editora Record, 1992); 
Juracy Magalhães and José Alberto Gueiros. O último tenente. (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 
1996). 
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nationalistic blinders that defined the 1965 saga itself. Given the limitations of this scholarship, 
the present article aims to contribute the most thorough examination to-date of the border crisis. 
Archival and ethnographic research for this article was conducted at multiple locations in 
both countries.15 In Brazil, the ‘Memórias Reveladas’ project at the National Archive in Rio de 
Janeiro presented recently declassified documents from the dictatorship’s surveillance and 
security programs. Equally important were the holdings of the Itamaraty foreign ministry in 
Brasília, in particular a lengthy dossier on the secret ‘Operation Sagarana’ that until now has 
been unknown to scholars and offers unparalleled insight into the logistics of Brazil’s border 
actions. In Paraguay, the holdings of the Ministry of Foreign Relations was especially useful, as 
was the ‘Archive of Terror’ housed in the Ministry of Justice.16 Interviews were also conducted 
with surviving political figures, and nearly a dozen newspaper sources were consulted. 
Additionally, the role of the United States was analysed through two digital archives of State 
Department files.17 Considering that so much of the conflict consisted of back-and-forth 
allegations over the exact events along the border, the methodology used for this article enables a 
side-by-side comparison of each country’s narrative. Only in doing so can we make sense of 
what actually transpired between March of 1965 and June of 1966, and why it led to a new era of 
power relations in the Southern Cone. 
 
One border, two interpretations 
                                                 
15 Additional archival research in Buenos Aires and Washington D.C. would contribute to an 
even more complete examination of the border crisis. 
16 Informally known as the ‘Archivo del Terror’, this collection of documents from the 
Stroessner dictatorship is called the Centro de Documentación y Archivo para la Defensa de los 
Derechos Humanos (hereafter CDyA). 
17 Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), https://history.state.gov/; “Opening 
the Archives Project,” (hereafter OAP), http://library.brown.edu/openingthearchives/.  
Itaipu’s Forgotten History   8 
 
[Figure 1 here: Map of Contested Border and the Guaíra waterfalls 
Source: UW Cartography Lab.] 
 
To properly contextualise the actions and rhetoric that both nations would take 
throughout the 15-month standoff, it is necessary to first understand why Brazil and Paraguay 
had such radically different perceptions of their shared border (Figure 1). This difference of 
interpretation was based on the legacy of the War of the Triple Alliance and the subsequent 
Loizaga-Cotegipe Treaty of 1872 that designated the Guaíra waterfalls as the dividing line 
between nations. Paraguay referred to them collectively as the Salto de Guairá, an understanding 
that all seven of the falls belonged to one singular body of water. Brazil, on the other hand, 
called these the Sete Quedas (‘seven falls’), implying that each was unique from the others.18 
This distinction is critical because the Treaty of 1872 stipulated that the border between Brazil 
and Paraguay would stretch from the Mbaracajú mountain range toward ‘the waterway or canal 
of the Paraná River… to the Great Fall of the Seven Falls’.19 Paraguay thus interpreted the treaty 
to mean that the border stretched to the northern end of the waterfalls and encompassed all of 
them, while Brazil considered the frontier to bisect at the fifth fall—the tallest of the seven 
cascades. In the context of Cold War ambitions to harness the untapped energy of the Paraná, 
Paraguay’s understanding that the waterfall (singular) belonged to both countries protected its 
claim to participate in any development project that included any portion of the falls. For Brazil, 
                                                 
18 Seeking a neutral position, the present article employs the term ‘Guairá waterfalls’, combining 
both Paraguay’s title of Guairá, and Brazil’s use of the plural cascades.  
19 See ‘Tratado de límites entre la Repupública del Paraguay y el Império del Brasil’, 1872. 
Source: Archivo Histórico de la Cancillería de Paraguay. (Hereafter AHCP). A note to readers: 
the holdings of the AHCP are not categorically organized. As such, cited evidence contains only 
the identifying numbers of the original documents themselves. 
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however, the belief that the border bisected the waterfalls (plural) justified building a 
hydroelectric dam on its section of the river that would completely circumvent Paraguayan 
waters. In the 100 years since the War of the Triple Alliance, Paraguay consistently emphasized 
that the 1872 Treaty had left a 20km ‘no man’s land’ east of the Guaíra waterfalls. Brazil, 
however, maintained that the border’s demarcation was clearly outlined, and refused to 
acknowledge Paraguay’s claims. From 1872 through the early 1960s, dozens of bi-national 
meetings were held to discuss unresolved border issues, many of which made reference to the 
20kms of un-demarcated mountains along the Paraná River.20 
A parallel controversy implicated Argentina, a country with an equally important claim to 
the Paraná. Although the river originates in Brazilian territory, its downstream flow forms the 
border with both Paraguay and Argentina before finally emptying out into the Plate basin and the 
Atlantic Ocean. Throughout the 20th century, Argentina encouraged river-use regulations based 
on the principle of ‘prior consultation’ in order to protect itself from any damages from upstream 
development—specifically targeting Brazil. In the first half of the century, when Argentina’s 
regional superiority was more evident, its proposals for river regulation were respected.21 As 
Brazil’s influence grew, however, it rejected Argentina’s attachment to prior consultation and 
instead cited the 1895 Harmon Doctrine—named for the former U.S. Attorney General—to 
claim that it had no obligation to share water with any downstream nations.22 
After simmering as a persistent yet relatively uneventful issue for nearly a century, the 
question of how to use the Paraná River was thrust into the spotlight at the beginning of 1964. 
                                                 
20 Key meetings of the Joint Border Commission included the 2nd Conference of 7/29/1933; the 
11th Conference of 8/21/1939; the 13th Conference of 5/5/1941; the 15th Conference of 
5/29/1945; the 21st Conference of 12/21/1955; and the 25th Conference of 11/20/1961. The 
minutes of these meetings are all housed in the AHCP. 
21 Soares de Lima. The Political Economy of Brazilian Foreign Policy, pp. 352-357. 
22 Ibid., pp. 347. 
Itaipu’s Forgotten History   10 
On January 19, Alfredo Stroessner and João Goulart met to discuss the river’s hydroelectric 
development. Given the political context at the time, this meeting might have seemed 
impossible: Goulart was a leftist social reformer while Stroessner was a military dictator at the 
head of a violent regime. Yet the mutual desire to harness the industrializing power of the river 
motivated each leader to put aside their opposing political views. Goulart’s vision for a border 
dam differed drastically from that of the dictatorship that would eventually make the project a 
reality. After his meeting with Stroessner, Goulart stated that Paraguay’s participation would be 
“a sincere, total, and absolute collaboration”—a concession that Brazil’s dictatorship would only 
ever nominally make.23 Goulart also mentioned that Argentina and Uruguay would be consumers 
of the dam’s energy, an indication that he saw a hydroelectric project as a means to strengthen 
the geopolitical unity of the Southern Cone.24 Brazil’s military government used Itaipu for the 
exact opposite purpose, and instead saw a bi-national dam as a way to enhance its own power at 
the expense of neighbouring countries. Moreover, rumours suggested that Goulart would fund 
the dam with loans from the Soviet Union—a fact that surely incensed the anti-communist 
sectors in Brazil that were already plotting a regime change.25 
The United States was similarly opposed to Goulart. Although the U.S. government did 
not have a direct hand in the eventual Brazilian coup, it did systematically undermine Goulart’s 
presidency—what one historian has called a ‘quiet intervention’.26 Under the banner of the 
Alliance for Progress, both the Kennedy (1961-63) and Johnson (1963-69) administrations saw 
Brazil as essential to winning the Cold War in Latin America. As noted in a 1963 State 
                                                 
23 “Encontro de Presidentes: Paraguai Apóia Construção de Sete Quedas.” Última Hora, 
1/21/1964, pp. 6. 
24 “Stroessner faz acôrdo com Goulart: Sete Quedas.” Jornal do Brasil, 1/21/1964, pp. 1. 
25 “7 Quedas: não há compromisso com USSR,” O Jornal, 1/5/1964, pp. 1; “Goulart responderá 
à nota soviética, que não faz ofertas,” Jornal do Brasil, 1/5/1964, pp. 3. 
26 Rabe. The Killing Zone, pp. 107-108. 
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Department memo, “If U.S. policy fails in Brazil, it will become extremely difficult to achieve 
success elsewhere in Latin America.”27 Yet Goulart was a steady thorn in the side of U.S. 
interests as he renewed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and resisted Kennedy’s efforts 
to isolate Cuba from the rest of the hemisphere.28  Moreover, the U.S. company International 
Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) was nationalized by Goulart’s brother-in-law Leonel Brizola, the 
governor of Rio Grande do Sul.29 And as Goulart continued to unveil increasingly progressive 
policies—including a vision for large-scale agrarian reform—the United States closely 
monitored the possibilities for military intervention. On the cusp of the 1964 coup, Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk informed Lincoln Gordon, the U.S. ambassador in Brazil, that the U.S. was 
committed to seeing the overthrow of Goulart’s “communist dominated dictatorship.”30  
Late in the night of March 31, a coup deposed Goulart and established a military regime 
that would rule Brazil for twenty-one years. Although the U.S. did not have a direct hand in the 
March 31 coup, declassified documents from the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicate that if needed by 
Brazil’s army, a package of weapons was in reserve at McGuire Air Force base, a carrier ship 
was waiting in nearby waters, and oil shipments were ready for delivery.31 Lincoln Gordon 
                                                 
27 State Department paper, “Guidelines of U.S. Policy and Operations, Brazil,” 7 February 1963, 
FRUS, 1961-1963 Vol. 12: pp. 487-90. 
28 Joseph Smith. Brazil and the United States: Convergence and Divergence. (Athens: University 
of Georgia Press, 2010), pp. 154-156. 
29 W. Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coups d’Etat: Brazilian-American Relations, 1945-1964, 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), pp. 153. 
30 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil, 30 March 1964, FRUS 1964-
1968 Vol. 31, Doc. 194. 
31 J. Patrice McSherry. Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America. 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), pp. 53 
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would later compare the importance of Goulart’s downfall to “the Marshall Plan, the Berlin 
Blockade … and the resolution of the missile crisis in Cuba.”32 
 The Johnson administration recognized the new government within 18 hours of the coup, 
and soon thereafter gave Brazil an emergency $50 million loan. In the remaining years of the 
1960s, Brazil’s dictatorship received $1.2 billion from the United States, making it the largest 
recipient of Alliance for Progress funds in the western hemisphere.33 In the initial stages of the 
new military regime—before glaring human rights abuses forced the United States to wean its 
support—Brazil’s dictatorship proved to be a very beneficial investment for the U.S. 
government. In particular, Brazil took a leading role in the U.S. invasion of the Dominican 
Republic, thereby helping legitimise an intervention that was otherwise unpopular among most 
Latin American nations.34 An analysis of U.S. financial support to Paraguay and Argentina 
during the 1960s further reveals shifts in the region’s geopolitical landscape. Paraguay was the 
first nation in Latin America to request aid from the Alliance for Progress, and its package of $80 
million amounted to almost 25 percent of its entire gross domestic product (GDP).35 Among 
other initiatives, U.S. economic aid helped construct a 200-mile highway connecting the 
Paraguayan capital of Asunción to the Brazilian border. This U.S.-funded road gave Paraguay a 
new commercial trade route to the Atlantic Ocean, further reorienting Paraguay’s economic and 
                                                 
32 Thomas E. Skidmore. The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), pp. 28. 
33 Rabe, The Killing Zone, pp. 108. 
34 When the U.S. invaded the Dominican Republic in April 1965, most Latin American countries 
criticized the action as a violation of sovereignty and the charter of the Organization of American 
states (OAS). In exchange for sending troops, a Brazilian general was appointed the top 
command position of the Inter-American Peace Force. For more, see Ruth Leacock. Requiem for 
Revolution the United States and Brazil, 1961-1969. (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 
1990), pp. 235-236. 
35 Frank O. Mora and Jerry W. Cooney. Paraguay and the United States. (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2007), pp. 167. 
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political compass away from Argentina and toward Brazil. Frank Mora and Jerry Cooney write 
that the United States supported Stroessner’s growing ties with Brazil largely because the U.S. 
State Department was increasingly suspicious of Argentina’s civilian president Arturo Illia 
(1963-1966).36 Illia had vowed to cancel all foreign oil contracts in Argentina, all while 
significantly increasing commercial ties to the Soviet Union.37 Consequently, the U.S. economic 
aid to Argentina decreased from $135 million in 1963 to $21 million in 1964.38 These trends 
accelerated Brazil’s continued emergence as the major force in the Southern Cone. 
Despite these emerging financial and political alliances, the relationship between Brazil 
and Paraguay was far from simple. Both countries were ruled by military regimes with similar 
worldviews, yet it was exactly that overlap in geopolitical ambition that would soon incite a 
major crisis. Even the names of their policies were foreboding: in Paraguay, Stroessner called his 
realignment away from Argentina the ‘March to the East’, and starting in the 1930s, Brazil’s 
own vision for territorial and ideological expansion had been known as the ‘March to the West’. 
Each government set its sights on the energy potential of the Paraná River and began to press its 
claims to the border region around the Guaíra waterfalls. For nearly a century the diverging 
interpretations of the border had existed rather benignly, but in the Cold War climate of the 
1960s it produced a stalemate wherein both governments felt that their position was the only 
possible version of the truth. A report from Brazil’s National Intelligence Service would later 
                                                 
36 Mora and Cooney, Paraguay and the United States, pp. 180. On the heels of the previous 
presidency of Arturo Frondizi (1958-1962), Illia offered renewed challenges to U.S. interests, 
especially in the context of the 1963 oil crisis. For more see Dustin Walcher, ‘Petroleum Pitfalls, 
The United States, Argentina, Nationalism, and the 1963 Oil Crisis,’ Diplomatic History, 2003 
37(1): 24-57. 
37 José Paradiso. Debates y trayectoria de la política exterior argentina. (Buenos Aires, 
Argentina: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1993), pp. 150. 
38 Lester D. Langley. America and the Americas: the United States in the Western Hemisphere. 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989). 
Itaipu’s Forgotten History   14 
describe Paraguay’s beliefs as ‘entirely absurd, a perversion of legal-historical fact… by a 
pseudo-geographic worldview’.39 Paraguay, for its part, considered its stance to be ‘completely 
solid’ and ridiculed Brazil’s assertions that the border had been ‘definitively and fully 
demarcated since 1872’.40 It was in this context of mutual distrust that the simmering border 
conflict began to boil over. 
 
The border takes centre stage 
 
 The day before the contingent of Paraguayans gathered near Guaíra on March 21, 1965, 
General Alfredo Stroessner had personally visited the border. According to Paraguay’s Minister 
of the Interior, Stroessner wanted to ‘survey and measure the geopolitical potential of the area’ 
and left instructions to assemble the local population in order to inform them of ‘our frontier 
divisions and our rights [in] the region’.41 The following day nearly one hundred Paraguayans 
gathered along the shores of the Paraná where a ceremony was held, the Paraguayan flag was 
raised, the national anthem was sung, and patriotic speeches were given that proclaimed the 
region to belong to Paraguay.42 (Figure 2) According to evidence compiled by Brazil’s Operation 
Sagarana, these speeches included statements that ‘Paraguay would recuperate this territory that 
                                                 
39 Secret letter from João Baptista Figueiredo to President Emílio Médici, 12/1/1969. Exposição 
de Motivos No. 056/69, in: BR AN, BSB N8.0.PSN, EST.285, National Archive-Brasília 
(henceforth AN-BSB). 
40 Paraguay citations come from DPI 712, 12/14/1965, AHCP; and ‘Suscinta informacion sobre 
el diferendo paraguayo-brasileño relativo al salto del guaira’. 3/15/66, AHCP. 
41 Ynsfrán, Un giro geopolítico, pp. 70. 
42 As described in: Ynsfrán, Un giro geopolítico, 70; and Brazilian Embassy Note 322, 
11/8/1965, AHCP.  
Itaipu’s Forgotten History   15 
was stolen from them after the War of the Triple Alliance’.43 A series of investigative reports 
published in the Jornal do Brasil reveal that three Brazilian citizens who lived nearby witnessed 
these actions, and one even ran home to get a camera. Once the Paraguayans had left, all three 
Brazilians went to the nearest military office to hand over the film negatives and give official 
testimony to what they saw.44 
 
[Figure 2 here: Paraguay’s Flag-Raising Ceremony, March 21 1965. Major Meza Guerrero 
addresses the crowd along the border. 
Source: EG dpr 1979.03.08, Pasta III, doc. 60-A1. CPDOC-FGV.] 
 
A few weeks later, Coronel Octávio da Silva Tosta, as head of the National Security 
Council’s Special Border Commission (Comissão Especial da Faixa da Fronteira) went to the 
region to verify Paraguay’s actions and, more importantly, to plan Brazil’s response. It was on 
this visit that Coronel Tosta began formulating what would become Operation Sagarana, a secret 
collaboration between Itamaraty, the army, and various government ministries. With the explicit 
goal of occupying the border region militarily, Operation Sagarana sought to link the frontier 
zone to the adjacent Brazilian states of Paraná and Mato Groso do Sul, a process intended to also 
curb Paraguay’s influence in the area. Colonel Tosta returned to Rio de Janeiro and presented his 
report to the National Security Council. The details of Operation Sagarana were then outlined in 
meetings with General Artur da Costa e Silva, the Minister of War, and Vasco Leitão da Cunha, 
                                                 
43 ‘Operation Sagarana’, Secret report CTF/1, 254(43), paragraph 29. 6/22/1967. Arquivo 
Histórico de Itamaraty, Brasília (henceforth AHI). 
44 ‘Hasteamento da bandeira paraguaia em Coronel Renato provocou a sua ocupação pelos 
militares brasileiros’. Jornal do Brasil, 1/6/1966, pp. 7. This article was the second in a five-part 
series on the border conflict. The witness testimony was then passed along to General Alvaro 
Tavares do Carmo, Commander of the 5th Military Region. Source: Ministry of War No. 994/S-
102-CIE. In BR.DFAN.BSB.Z4.SNA.CFR.0007. AN-BSB. 
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the Minister of Foreign Relations.45 With the operation’s framework in place, the authorisation 
was given to deploy members of the Brazilian military to the exact location where the 
Paraguayans had held their ceremonies.46 
Two months later, on June 17, a detachment made up of one sergeant and seven soldiers 
crossed the Paraná River and set up camp just south of a small outpost known as Porto Coronel 
Renato.47 More than any other aspect of the 15-month border conflict, it was this presence of 
Brazil’s military that caused the most controversy. For Paraguay, this ‘act of aggression’ was 
nothing short of a complete violation of its territorial sovereignty.48 Brazil, on the other hand, 
considered Porto Renato to be within its own national boundaries and thus saw Paraguay’s 
previous actions in March—and not its own movement in June—as the actual invasion. Well 
aware of the reactions that this military incursion would incite, the Brazilian government 
deployed a Cold War rationale by saying that the detachment was only there to protect against 
communist terrorism along the border.49 Over the course of the next year, Brazil routinely 
downplayed both the size and importance of these soldiers, referring to the group as nothing but 
‘a tiny detachment’ or implying that their presence in the region was merely ‘symbolic’.50 
                                                 
45 ‘Operation Sagarana’, Secret report CTF/1, 254(43), paragraphs 30-32, 38. 6/22/1967. AHI. 
46 Ministry of War No. 994/S-102-CIE. In BR.DFAN.BSB.Z4.SNA.CFR.0007. National 
Archive, Rio de Janeiro (henceforth AN-RJ).  
47 Ibid., 4. It should be noted that the present article offers the first evidence of the exact date that 
Brazilian troops occupied the border. In all previous scholarship, it was only known that these 
soldiers arrived at some point in June. 
48 ‘Antecedentes históricos del litigio Paraguay-Brasil’. 5/10/1966. AHCP.  
49 Verbal note from Castello Branco to Stroessner, 9/1/65. AHCP. 
50 References to the small size of the detachment come from Minutes of the National Security 
Council (CNS), 3/16/1966, in BR AN,BSB N8.0.PSN, EST.286; the symbolism of the troops 
was noted by Chancellor Juracy Magalhães in an interview on 4/5/1966, source: JM pi 
66.04.05/1, CPDOC-FGV. 
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Internal documents, however, indicate that Brazil explicitly sent the detachment in order to 
‘counteract Paraguay’s growing presence in the region’.51 
 News of Brazil’s garrison in Porto Renato made its way to Asunción where Paraguayan 
authorities immediately began applying diplomatic pressure for the removal of the troops. 
Chancellor Raul Sapena Pastor met routinely with Jaime Souza Gomes, the Brazilian 
ambassador, and even General Stroessner made personal appeals to his colleagues in Brazil. 
Having made little progress in Asunción, Chancellor Pastor travelled to Brasília in early July to 
make his appeal directly to Brazil’s Foreign Minister.52 For nearly two months Brazil gave no 
response, nor did it officially acknowledge that it had even sent troops across the Paraná River. 
On September 1 Brazil’s president, General Humberto Castello Branco, finally sent a letter to 
Stroessner in which he stated that the group in Porto Renato ‘cannot represent anything 
inconvenient or harmful for either country, and that its presence can by no means indicate a 
strategy of pressure, coercion or repression on the part of the Brazilian Government’.53 Nowhere 
in his note did Castello Branco refer to the appeal to have the troops removed. The dismissive 
tone of this letter must have incensed Paraguay—one report noted that Stroessner himself was 
left ‘totally unsatisfied’—and the Ministry of Foreign Relations spent the next three weeks 
preparing a lengthy response.54 This marked the beginning of a back-and-forth exchange 
between foreign ministries that one Paraguayan official referred to as ‘a veritable paper war’.55 
                                                 
51 Secret letter from João Baptista Figueiredo to President Emílio Médici, 12/1/1969. Exposição 
de Motivos No. 056/69, in: BR AN,BSB N8.0.PSN, EST.285, AN-BSB. 
52 Minutes of the National Security Council (CNS), 3/16/1966, in BR AN,BSB N8.0.PSN, 
EST.286. AN-BSB. 
53 Verbal note from Castello Branco to Stroessner, 9/1/65. AHCP. 
54 Telegram 408, Brazil embassy in Asunción, 11/28/1965. DAM/DF/932.(42)(43). AHI. 
55 Ynsfrán, Un giro geopolítico, 73. In the following months six letters were exchanged between 
both foreign ministries on the following dates: 9/25, 10/22, 10/29, 11/8, 11/9, and 12/14. Source: 
AHI. 
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As this conflict unfolded in the sphere of diplomatic communication, it also began to materialise 
on the ground itself. 
 
Jockeying for control of the border 
 
 In the middle of October, Paraguay received reports that Brazil was constructing 
barracks, roads, and even an airstrip on the lands adjacent to Porto Renato—the early results of 
Operation Sagarana. On October 20 Chancellor Pastor delivered a letter to Ambassador Souza 
Gomes hoping that Brazil could confirm its increased presence along the border. Expressing his 
disappointment in how unresponsive Brazil had been over the previous month, Pastor also 
indicated that he had just commissioned a group of important Paraguayan authorities to travel to 
the ‘un-demarcated zone’ to report back personally to him.56 On the morning of October 21, 
1965—exactly seven months after Paraguay’s previous trip to the border region—five men 
boarded a plane in Asunción and after landing on an empty road due to a lack of airports, drove 
in a jeep to where the Brazilian detachment was stationed. This group consisted of Pedro 
Godinot de Villare, the Undersecretary of Foreign Relations; Carlos Saldivar, the Chancellor’s 
legal advisor; Emilio Meza Guerrero, a former general and engineer with the National Border 
Commission; Conrado Pappalardo, Stroessner’s Chief-of-Staff; and an accompanying 
photographer. The group arrived in Porto Renato in the early afternoon and began taking pictures 
of the newly constructed facilities along the eastern shore of the Paraná River. A truck carrying 
Brazilian soldiers quickly appeared and detained the group for several hours. 
                                                 
56 DPI 604, 10/22/1965. Source: AHCP. 
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 What happened next depends on who is telling the story, as each country would craft a 
narrative according to its own geopolitical needs. For understanding the importance of these 
actions, however, what matters is not distilling the ‘truth’ of what happened. Rather, we must 
trace how these competing stories were re-told and disseminated by each nation, quickly 
becoming a central hub on which the border conflict would revolve. 
 The only two living members of the arrested Paraguayans, Saldivar and Pappalardo, offer 
their version of what took place in Porto Renato. Both men recall that the Brazilian sergeant 
refused to provide a reason for their detainment, and was extremely insulting and condescending. 
Saldivar remembers feeling particularly anxious because, to him, the previous months ‘had felt 
like a war… we knew what had happened [in the War of the Triple Alliance], and our arrest 
could have started another one’.57 A moment of tension that stands out in Pappalardo’s memories 
was when Meza Guerrero was instructed to hand over his gun but refused, claiming that it was 
his right as a Paraguayan to defend himself whenever necessary. Trying to deflate the situation, 
Pappalardo told his compatriot, ‘Emilio, my dear friend, hand over your pistol to this sergeant, 
and tomorrow I’ll buy you five new ones back in Asunción’. It was at this point, according to 
Pappalardo, that Brazilian reinforcements arrived in the form of an army major, a captain, two 
lieutenants, and a company of ‘heavily armed soldiers’ who assumed ‘combat positions’ and 
treated them with ‘total incivility’.58 A Paraguayan press release emphasized these details, 
accusing Brazilian authorities of ‘mistreatment’.59 For the remainder of the afternoon, the 
Paraguayans were forced to sit outside—on tree stumps, according to Saldivar—until the 
                                                 
57 Carlos Saldivar, interview by author. January 14, 2015. Asunción, Paraguay. 
58 Conrado Pappalardo, interview by author. January 5, 2015. Asunción, Paraguay. 
59 ‘Press release from the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores’, 10/26/1965. Source: AHCP. 
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Commander of Brazil’s southern army arrived and gave the authorisation to release the five 
men.60  
 In Brazil’s recounting of these events, the biggest discrepancy was that ‘the Paraguayan 
commission was never at any point detained’ and that it was simply a matter of waiting until the 
proper authorities could arrive.61 Brazil’s narrative claimed the following sequence of events. 
When initially approached by the Brazilian soldiers, the Paraguayan authorities refused to give 
their names, and when instructed to hand over their photography equipment, Meza Guerrero 
refused and acted in an increasingly threatening manner. The Brazilian sergeant then told the 
photographer to stay where he was until the commanding officer, Capitan Gildon Pinto de 
Madeiras, could come sort out the situation. Meza Guerrero asked if they were being arrested 
and the sergeant told him no, that only the photographer was being asked to stay put. According 
to one version disseminated in the Brazilian press, the Paraguayan authorities then voluntarily 
‘turned themselves in’ as an act of solidarity with their detained photographer.62 When Captain 
Madeiras arrived, he instructed the Paraguayans that they were not permitted to take photographs 
of Brazil’s military presence, and moreover, that they had intruded two kilometres into Brazilian 
territory. Outraged at the suggestion that this land belonged to Brazil, Meza Guerrero drew his 
gun and threatened to ‘send an armed squadron of Paraguayans to trap the Brazilian soldiers’. It 
was at this point that Meza Guerrero was asked to hand over his weapon and the situation calmed 
down immediately. According to Brazil, ‘everything ended with a perfect understanding, with 
                                                 
60 According to different versions of the story, the Paraguayans were detained between four and 
six hours. 
61 Brazilian Embassy Note 322, 11/8/1965. Source: AHCP. 
62 ‘Hasteamento da bandeira paraguaia em Coronel Renato provocou a sua ocupação pelos 
militares brasileiros’. Jornal do Brasil, 1/6/1966, pp. 7. 
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normal farewells’ and Meza Guerrero even extended a cordial invitation to the Brazilian officers 
to spend the December holidays with their families in Asunción. 
 Regardless of how exactly this incident transpired, it served to rapidly accelerate the 
border conflict. And whereas the early months of this standoff had mostly existed in the realm of 
inter-embassy exchanges, the events of October 21 attracted widespread media attention and 
inaugurated the battle for public opinion that would play out over the following year. Paraguay in 
particular seized on this new theatre of conflict and routinely portrayed Brazil as the aggressor. 
As Christine Folch has shown, the Paraguayan public was shown that Brazil’s presence in Guaíra 
‘was nothing less than a provocation to war and an affront to Paraguay’s national sovereignty. 
Speeches and letters to the editor in repudiation of Brazilian aggression were an almost a daily 
feature in October and November 1965’.63 In response, Brazil maintained that there did not exist 
a disputed region and that the land near Porto Renato was entirely within its own boundaries.64 
News of the October 21 arrests circulated widely and sparked debate over the possibility of 
international mediation as Argentina, Uruguay, and even the United Nations were proposed as 
potential arbiters.65 
On November 24, Stroessner had two different meetings with foreign leaders to discuss 
the simmering border conflict. First, he spent the late morning with Dean Rusk, the U.S. 
Secretary of State who was returning from giving the keynote speech at a conference in Rio de 
Janeiro. The transcript of this meeting reveals the depths of Stroessner’s desire to be respected by 
world leaders: after emphasizing how well his soldiers had done in supporting the U.S. invasion 
                                                 
63 Folch. ‘Surveillance and State Violence in Stroessner’s Paraguay’, pp. 47. 
64 ‘Itamarati nega litigio entre Brasil-Paraguai’, Folha de São Paulo, 11/3/65, pp. 13. 
65 This news comes from ‘Brasil propõe ao Paraguai arbitragem internacional’ Folha de São 
Paulo 11/16/1965, pp. 11; and ‘Brasil quer arbitragem em 7 Quedas’, Jornal do Brasil 
11/18/1965, pp. 17. 
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of the Dominican Republic, Stroessner complained that Paraguay was receiving far less 
economic aid than other Latin American countries. He then boasted that many foreign 
dignitaries, including French president Charles de Gaulle, ‘had assured him that he was a great 
president presiding over an exemplary government’. Stroessner ended the meeting with an 
appeal that bordered on neediness, imploring Rusk to give Paraguay ‘more attention at the top 
and more favourable treatment in general’.66 Despite the U.S.’s positive leanings toward 
Paraguay—Richard Nixon would later praise Paraguay ‘for opposing communism more strongly 
than any other nation in the world’67—the meeting with Secretary Rusk left little doubt that 
Brazil was the preferred partner of the United States.  
In the afternoon Stroessner then met with the Brazilian general Golbery do Couto e Silva, 
who was not only one of the most influential officials of the military regime, but also a former 
colleague of Stroessner’s.68 Couto e Silva’s role in mediating the border situation was especially 
significant since he was the ideological architect of the dictatorship’s Doctrine of National 
Security (Doutrina de Segurança Nacional, DSN). Formed during his tenure at the Superior War 
College, Couto e Silva’s vision for the DSN included theories of war, of Brazil’s potential as a 
world superpower, and a development model that combined Keynesian economics and state 
capitalism.69 Industrialization was key to achieving the goals of the DSN, yet Brazil’s industrial 
                                                 
66 Memo of Conversation, State Department. FRUS, 1964–1968 Vol. 31, South and Central 
America; Mexico, Doc. 465.  
67 Dennis Hanratty and Sandra Meditz. Paraguay: A Country Study. (Washington, DC: Library 
of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1990), pp. 46.  
68 ‘Diplomacia’ Ultima Hora, 11/25/1965, pp. 6. Couto e Silva had been dispatched to Asunción 
at the personal request of President Castello Branco, largely because he and Stroessner knew 
each other well from their time together in the Brazilian Army Mission in Paraguay. 
69 Helena Moreira Alves. State and Opposition in Military Brazil. (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1985), pp. 8. 
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progress had been slowed by a lack of consistent energy sources.70 A hydroelectric dam on the 
Paraná River thus presented Couto e Silva and his colleagues with the prospect of enough energy 
to power a new era of industrialization. Additionally, Couto e Silva surely saw the Guaíra 
standoff as a perfect opportunity to fulfil the idea of ‘fronteiras vivas’ (living borders). This 
ideology linked Brazil’s global prowess to the development of its borders—both in the sense of 
physical fortification, and also of Brazil’s ideological ascension beyond the boundaries of its 
nation-state.71 Under Couto e Silva’s guidance in the 1960s, these development ideologies would 
eventually make the Itaipu dam the paragon of state development. It also set in motion the 
expansion of Brazilian farmers across the Paraguayan border and the establishment of new 
agricultural colonies. 
While politicians and military officials worked behind the scenes, the unfolding border 
conflict motivated popular forces to mobilise direct responses. On November 27 a demonstration 
was held in Asunción that was organised primarily by the youth sections of the Febrerista and 
Christian Democrats opposition parties. In full defiance of Paraguay’s Law 294 that outlawed 
almost all forms of public protest, the crowd wound its way through downtown, stopping only at 
targeted locations: they burned a Brazilian flag in front of the Commerce Office of the Brazilian 
Embassy, threw Molotov cocktails through the windows of various Brazilian-owned business, lit 
smoke bombs across from the Centre for Brazilian studies, and spread graffiti on the walls of the 
Brazilian Military Offices proclaiming: ‘Paraguay sí, bandeirantes no: Fuera los mamelucos’ 
                                                 
70 Joel Bergsman, a U.S. economist who worked for Brazil’s Ministry of Planning in 1966, noted 
that despite Brazil’s immense hydroelectric potential, electric power remained a persistent 
problem. In particular, the country’s industrial centres of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro had 
suffered major power shortages since the 1940s. Source: Joel Bergsman. Brazil: Industrialization 
and Trade Policies. (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 64. 
71 Golbery do Couto e Silva. Geopolítica do Brasil. (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria J. Olympio, 1967). 
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(Paraguay yes, invaders no: out with the bastards).72 The Paraguayan police descended on the 
protestors, violently dispersed the crowd and arrested 15 students.73  
This demonstration was significant not only because it indicated the Paraguayan youth’s 
willingness to defy a repressive dictatorship, but even more because it belied the myth 
propagated by Stroessner that the entire country rallied behind his government to oppose Brazil. 
Over the following months, a specific narrative played on loop in the state-sponsored media, 
suggesting that for the first time since Stroessner took power in 1954 all political factions in 
Paraguay could unite around a common cause.74 For Stroessner, this was an opportunity to 
deflect criticism toward an external target, allowing him to declare that,  
All the sectors of public opinion in Paraguay have expressed their outrage at the 
occupation of the non-demarcated border zone by Brazilian forces. All of the 
centres, associations, clubs, students… the unions, [the] cultural, social, and 
political groups, the veterans of the Chaco War, the Army Reserves, everyone 
without exception has spontaneously denounced the hostile attitude [of Brazil].75  
                                                 
72 More than just invader, bandeirante refers to the slaving raids in colonial Paraguay by 
Brazilians from the São Paulo region. Mameluco is a Portuguese word that refers to the first 
generation offspring of a European and an Amerindian. Its use during the protests in Paraguay 
can be seen as a reference both to Brazil’s alleged sense of superiority (for having descended 
from European culture), and the historical violation that Brazil wrought on native lands.  
73 Descriptions of the November 27 demonstration come from CDyA 1F 0974-981; 9F 1829-
1831; ‘Hasteamento da bandeira paraguaia em Coronel Renato provocou a sua ocupação pelos 
militares brasileiros’. Jornal do Brasil, 1/6/1966, pp. 7; Ricardo Caballero Aquino, interview by 
author, January 7, 2015, Asunción, Paraguay; and Note 949, Brazil embassy in Asunción, 
12/2/1965. AHI. 
74 Examples of news articles discussing the unifying perception of opposition to Brazil include 
‘El Partido R. Febrerista se Pronuncia en Diferendo Fronterizo con Brasil’, El Pueblo 1/6/1966; 
‘Centro Paraguayo de Ingenieros al Condenar Actitud Inamistosa de Brasil se Solidariza con el 
Gobierno’, Patria 1/14/1966. 
75 Stroessner speech to Paraguay’s House of Representatives, 4/1/1966. Reproduced in Giménez, 
Sobre el salto del Guairá al oido de América,  pp. 6-13. 
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Yet the November 27 protest was evidence to the contrary, since it targeted both the 
Brazilian occupation and Stroessner’s own complicity. Ricardo Caballero Aquino was a high 
school student when he participated in the protest, and remembers that a central rallying cry was 
how the dictatorship had sold out the Paraguayan people in order to allow Brazil to take over 
Guaíra. Moreover, Caballero Aquino recalls speeches from that day where student leaders spoke 
of how Stroessner had gone to military school in Rio de Janeiro and ‘has been in love with Brazil 
ever since’.76 This criticism of Stroessner was not misplaced, since he did study in Brazil and 
maintained close ties with the Brazilian military. Itamaraty was keenly aware of this fact and 
sought to exploit Stroessner’s need to balance ‘his personal feelings with the official stance of 
the Paraguayan government’.77 Along with an overarching desire to participate in a Paraná 
hydroelectric project, Stroessner’s connections to Brazil help explain his administration’s 
approach to navigating a standoff with its much larger neighbour. Despite Stroessner’s public 
declarations that all of Paraguay was united against the occupation of its frontier, he proved very 
willing to appease Brazil at key moments of the border conflict. Less than a week after the anti-
Brazil student protests, the Stroessner regime officially apologised to the Brazilian government 
and offered full compensation for the damages incurred.78 
 Tensions continued to mount and according to Mario Gibson Barboza—the newly 
appointed ambassador in Asunción—1966 began in a climate of ‘enormous difficulty. Brazil 
found itself on the brink of war with Paraguay … The conflict was strong and violent, the 
impasse deep and insurmountable … and all over the great problem of sovereignty, that magical 
                                                 
76 Ricardo Caballero Aquino, interview by author. January 7, 2015, Asunción, Paraguay. 
77 Secret note 839. 930(42)(43), Brazil embassy in Asunción, 11/5/1965. AHI. 
78 ‘Paraguai vai indenizar o Brasil’, O Globo 12/2/1965, pp. 8. 
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word for which people kill and are killed’.79 Seeking to win the support of the international 
community, Paraguay began sending out copies of its previous communication with Brazil to 
embassies and foreign ministries all over the world.80 In February, Chancellor Pastor wrote to 
Ambassador Barboza to express his ‘energetic protest’ in light of news that Brazil had recently 
built new roads along the border, and increased its presence in the region to over 600 men.81  
Comparing multiple versions of this letter offers some fascinating insight into the minutia of the 
border conflict. Although Brazil eventually received a fully edited copy, rough drafts can be 
found in the archive of Paraguay’s Ministry of Foreign Relations. Of particular interest are 
several instances where the original draft referenced the waterfalls as ‘los saltos’, (the falls) only 
to have hand-written notes in the margins change the wording to ‘el salto’ (the fall). This 
indicates that Paraguay’s interpretation was not automatically known, and that even within the 
foreign ministry great attention had to be given to putting forth a unified and consistent message. 
With so much depending on each country’s ability to defend its particular view of the border, 
even the slightest mistake could be disastrous.  
The increase of Brazil’s border presence was the product of the successful early stages of 
Operation Sagarana, the funding for which came from the Ministry of War and Itamaraty. After 
the detachment of troops in June fulfilled the first objective of occupying the region, Operation 
Sagarana moved on to its second phase and constructed multiple airstrips, a vast network of 
roads, multiple housing complexes, and electricity lines that connected Porto Renato to the city 
of Guaíra. Additionally, Coronel Tosta mobilised his connections with the Brazilian Institute for 
                                                 
79 Barboza, Na diplomacia, o traço todo da vida, pp. 85. 
80 The most widely distributed of these exchanges occurred in January of 1966, when Paraguay 
sent out copies of a lengthy letter (DPI No. 712) it had written to Brazil on December 14, 1965, 
sharing it with twenty different embassies throughout the world. Source: DPI notes 17-42, 1966. 
AHCP. 
81 DPI 75, 2/9/1966. Source: AHCP. 
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Agrarian Reform (Instituto Brasileiro de Reforma Agraria, IBRA), to secure land titles 
throughout the region. Tosta was close friends with IBRA’s Director of Land Resources, General 
Jaul Pires de Castro, who within 48 hours had signed a decree to expropriate lands in the border 
zone of Amambaí. These holdings were eventually used to accomplish the longer-term goals of 
building schools, hospitals, and residences to support an expanded military population.82 So 
while both governments jockeyed for political and diplomatic leverage in the ongoing border 
debate, Operation Sagarana steadily reinforced Brazil’s physical claim to the area.  
In early March, Brazil’s National Security Council convened to discuss the ongoing 
border conflict.83 In attendance were President Castello Branco, his entire cabinet, and every 
high-ranking government minister. The timing of this gathering was especially important since 
the Serviço de Segurança Nacional—a branch of the military’s secret police—had just submitted 
a report claiming that Paraguayan forces were planning to incite its border population to 
‘infiltrate Brazilian lands and massacre the soldiers posted in Porto Renato in order to “cleanse 
their national honor”’.84 No uprising ever occurred, and it is unlikely that Brazil’s top leaders 
saw Paraguay’s army as a credible threat. But even if the Brazilian government could disregard 
reports of potential border violence, it was still cognizant of the standoff’s wider meanings. 
President Castello Branco told the Security Council that the Guaíra conflict held serious 
implications for all of South America, and emphasized above all that Paraguay played an 
essential role in limiting the hegemony of Argentina.85 
The changing geopolitical landscape was evident to all governments involved. In 
Paraguay, the Stroessner regime sought to leverage its position between Brazil and Argentina—
                                                 
82 ‘Operation Sagarana’, Secret report CTF/1, 254(43), paragraphs 38-44. 6/22/1967. AHI. 
83 Minutes of the CNS, 3/16/1966, in BR AN.BSB N8.0.PSN, EST.286. AN-BSB. 
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both geographically and politically—to increase its own economic standing. A report from the 
U.S. embassy in Asunción observed that ‘To bring pressure on Brazil … Paraguay is now 
playing up improved relations with Argentina’.86 This eventually led Stroessner to negotiate a 
deal with Argentina for a second bi-national dam on the same Paraná River, a project that 
resulted in the Yacyretá hydroelectric station only 500 kilometres downstream of the future 
Itaipu site. Paraguay was thus able to play into the Brazil-Argentina rivalry to stake a claim to 
two different hydroelectric projects along its borders. For Argentina, competition over the Paraná 
River was part of what the former Argentine diplomat Juan Archibaldo Lanus referred to as the 
‘hydroelectric saga’.87 Along with threatening its own energy projects further downstream, a 
Brazil-Paraguay dam would cut off Argentina’s shipping and commercial lines to São Paulo 
through the Paraná-Tietê river systems. More conspiratorially, Argentina would later claim that 
Brazil could use a dam as a ‘water bomb’ weapon that could flood Buenos Aires.88 
Brazil’s willingness to antagonize neighbouring countries is explained, in part, by the fact 
that it could still count on the support of the U.S. government. At an economic forum held in 
Buenos Aires, Lincoln Gordon—now the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs—was 
approached by Paraguayan delegates who wished to speak with him about the border conflict at 
Guaíra. Gordon acknowledged that he had indeed received all of the documents that Paraguay 
had sent over the previous year—none of which received an official response—but indicated 
‘that it would be very difficult for Brazil to remove its military forces’. Moreover, he voiced his 
concerns about a ‘smear campaign’ in the Paraguayan media against Brazil. Although Gordon let 
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it be known that his government was siding with Brazil in the border conflict, he did inform the 
Paraguayans that the administration of Lyndon Johnson was very interested in the prospect of 
building a hydroelectric dam on the Paraná River.89 
 During this impasse, both governments continued to lobby potential allies and rally 
domestic support. In early April Stroessner gave a lengthy speech to the Paraguayan House of 
Representatives in which he denounced Brazil’s invasion of Guaíra and its failure to honour the 
legal and moral codes of ‘panamericanism that serve as the foundation of cooperation, solidarity, 
and friendship amongst the peoples of this hemisphere’. His description of Brazil as an 
imperialist nation was intended to juxtapose his characterisation of Paraguay as a ‘generous, 
welcoming, and heroic’ country that harboured neither ‘a domineering spirit nor greed’.90 The 
rhetoric of Stroessner’s speech reverberated almost daily in the pages of Paraguay’s newspapers. 
Patria, the official print organ of Stroessner’s Colorado Party, ran a month-long series of articles 
titled ‘Guairá in the spotlight of America’.91 Even opposition newspapers got swept up in wave 
of anti-Brazilian nationalism; El Pueblo, a paper connected to the Partido Febrerista 
Revolucionario, changed its masthead to proclaim that, ‘The Guairá Falls are and always will be 
Paraguayan’.92 Newspapers throughout the western hemisphere also provided coverage, 
including the New York Times and the Washington Post, and other large dailies in Mexico, 
Chile, Venezuela, Panama, and Argentina.93 
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The Brazilian presses did not replicate the same fiery discourse as their Paraguayan 
counterparts, but Juracy Magalhães consistently gave interviews with brash and often belittling 
statements about Paraguay. In response to Paraguay’s chancellor having called Brazil ‘aggressive 
and expansionist’, Magalhães said that, ‘All of the Americas are well aware of the situation of 
our two governments and knows which of the two must resort to fabricating artificial 
storylines’.94 At a speech to the Chamber of Deputies in the middle of May, Magalhães spoke at 
great length about the Treaty of 1872 and justified Brazil’s subsequent actions by declaring that, 
‘we have the duty to preserve the political legacy of our forefathers and the territory they left us’. 
Despite the political posturing that consumed most of his remarks, Magalhães concluded by 
appealing directly to Paraguay and hinted at the underlying current of the border conflict that 
would very soon take centre stage: ‘We hope that the Paraguayan government trusts in the 
genuine sincerity of our offer to meet together for the wellbeing of both of our friendly nations, 
in hopes of jointly developing all of the resources offered by the Sete Quedas waterfalls’.95 
 
The Act of Iguaçu and the birth of Itaipu 
 
 On June 21, representatives from both countries met in the border region for two intense 
days of negotiations that produced the Act of Iguaçu, a relatively short document that laid the 
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framework for a bi-national dam on the Paraná River.96 Brazil’s delegation consisted of 23 men 
from various ministries within the military regime, while Paraguay’s contingent counted 20 
individuals of similar positions—including all four of the political figures that had been arrested 
by Brazilian troops the previous October.97 The meeting got off to a rocky start as Paraguay’s 
delegation began by insisting on the creation of a neutral border zone and the 50/50 split of all 
energy eventually produced—the exact criteria that Brazil had refused throughout the preceding 
months.98 Brazil argued that a neutral frontier would set a dangerous precedent by which all of 
its borders could then, in theory, be challenged by any neighbouring country.99 This stalemate 
carried over into the afternoon and at one point Chancellor Sapena Pastor insinuated that the 
Treaty of 1872 needed to be reassessed. According to his own recounting, Magalhães responded 
by stating that a treaty could only be renegotiated by another treaty or by a war; and since Brazil 
refused to discuss a new treaty, he asked if Paraguay was willing to start a war. Taken aback, 
Sapena Pastor asked if the Brazilian chancellor was threatening Paraguay. Magalhães said that he 
was simply trying to have a realistic conversation based on facts.100 
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 It was at this peak of tension that the day’s negotiations were called off due to 
‘substantial differences’, with both parties agreeing to reconvene the next morning. Privately, 
Magalhães commented that this impasse might be insurmountable.101 Before leaving, however, 
Sapena Pastor and Magalhães exchanged proposals from their respective delegations. Each party 
deliberated deep into the night and returned the following morning with revised documents that 
were nearly identical. The main differences concerned two items that, as will be shown below, 
proved to be the most important of the entire negotiations. The entire second day was devoted to 
finding a solution to these two articles, and the both sides went back-and-forth for hours to 
determine the exact phrasing. 
At 7pm, in the presence of both delegations and various reporters, the final document was 
presented and signed by Magalhães and Sapena Pastor. It consisted of eight articles, with 
numbers three and four being the critical pair that had demanded so much attention. Article three 
stated that Brazil and Paraguay agreed to jointly explore the hydroelectric potential of their 
shared waters; the recognition that Paraguay shared equal domain to the Paraná River was 
celebrated as the Paraguayan delegation’s greatest accomplishment.102 Article four was the most 
controversial part of the final agreement. Although it proclaimed that the energy produced would 
be ‘divided equally between both countries’ it also stipulated that each nation maintained the 
right to buy the other’s unused portion ‘at a fair price’ (a justo preço). With a fraction of the 
population and energy needs of Brazil, it was obvious that Paraguay would use nowhere near its 
fifty-percent share of the energy. Paraguay had initially proposed that the left over energy be sold 
‘at cost price’ (a preço de custo) but gave in when Brazil threatened to end negotiations during 
                                                 
 
102 Special Border Commission Report, 9/16/1966, pp. 3. Source: AHCP. 
Itaipu’s Forgotten History   33 
the afternoon of the second day.103 As such, Brazil’s insertion of the intentionally vague ‘fair 
price’ clause guaranteed its ability to reap tremendous profits from the Itaipu dam.104 
A single memorandum was also attached to the final text. This document declared that 
although Brazil was firmly convinced of its territorial rights as granted by the Treaty of 1872, it 
would remove its troops from the border as a sign of goodwill. The very next paragraph states 
that Paraguay also maintained its interpretation of the Treaty of 1872 and asserted its own 
sovereign claim to the exact region occupied by Brazil’s military. What appears to be a 
fundamental paradox—both countries using an alleged peace treaty to codify the exact reasons 
that nearly brought them to war—is actually a perfect embodiment of the border conflict itself. 
Each government was willing to make public gestures of cooperation only because it helped lead 
to the development of a hydroelectric project. Yet neither was willing to change its ideological 
approach, a contradiction that hints at the ways in which the border conflict would continue to 
fester for years to come. 
The signing of the Act of Iguaçu was met with fanfare that invoked a discourse of 
modernization and unity. Magalhães proclaimed that they had dissolved the tensions that had 
‘sullied the longstanding friendship of Brazil and Paraguay’ and succeeded in honouring the pan-
American community by promoting ‘the peace and progress of our entire continent’. Sapena 
Pastor congratulated all involved for ‘finding solutions to the most difficult problems facing the 
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relationship between Brazil and Paraguay in the 20th century’.105 Newspapers in both countries 
quickly disseminated this triumphant narrative. In Asunción, La Tribuna celebrated the ‘positive 
and eloquent’ results of the meeting, and Rio de Janeiro’s O Globo remarked on the 
unprecedented exchange of peaceful negotiations that paved the way to construct the world’s 
largest dam.106 Despite the Act’s proclamation that it represented a new era of cooperation 
between Brazil and Paraguay, its symbolic achievements would repeatedly be tested. 
 Less than a week after the Act was signed, an O Globo article reported that Brazil had 
already begun to withdraw its soldiers from Porto Renato.107 If this were true it would have 
indicated that Brazil had been negotiating in good faith and that it was genuinely interested in 
building a new period of mutual prosperity. Yet the Brazilian government made no such efforts 
and the detachment remained firmly entrenched along the border. By September, Paraguay had 
grown so frustrated that Sapena Pastor went to the United Nations to denounce Brazil for having 
reneged on its promise. In response, Brazil said that although most of its troops had been 
removed, one sergeant and one corporal remained in order to guard the barracks and ‘dissuade 
contraband activities’.108 It was not until December 3—nearly 18 months after its soldiers first 
arrived in Porto Renato—that Brazil finally withdrew its military forces. 
Yet Brazil did not remove its troops without making one final deal, and secured a 
concession that it had been seeking for years: uninhibited access to the fertile agricultural lands 
of eastern Paraguay. In his analysis of the Paraná borderlands, Andrew Nickson writes that ‘In 
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exchange for the withdrawal of Brazilian troops from the Falls, agreed in the Act of Iguazu, the 
Paraguayan Government removed existing restrictions on Brazilian colonization’.109 Specifically, 
the Stroessner regime repealed the 1940 Agrarian Statute that had prohibited the sale of land to 
foreigners within 150 km of the border. Although this law had previously been circumvented—
Brazilian farmers had been trickling across the border for decades—its abolition meant that lands 
could now be sold openly. Brazilians began to flood en masse into Paraguay’s eastern frontier, 
setting off a wave of agricultural migrants known as ‘brasiguaios’—an amalgam of the 
Portuguese words for ‘Brazilian’ and ‘Paraguayan’.110 In 1962, fewer than 2,500 Brazilian 
colonists lived in Paraguay’s three main eastern border departments, but with the removal of 
legal restrictions that number soared to 29,000 in 1972, and 360,000 by 1983.111 Currently, there 
are an estimated 450,000 brasiguaios, representing 60 percent of the border region and nearly 10 
percent of Paraguay’s entire population.112 Brazil’s manoeuvres during the border crisis therefore 
secured not only geopolitical prestige and access to unprecedented hydroelectric energy, but a 
monopoly on what would quickly become a thriving agricultural enclave. By refusing to remove 
its troops unless Stroessner granted unfettered access to new lands, the Brazilian government 
expanded its reach even deeper into Paraguayan territory. 
Conclusion 
 
 In the mid-1960s a bi-national dam had represented the chance to solve two problems at 
once: the governments of Brazil and Paraguay were able to harness the hydroelectric power of 
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the Paraná River while also resolving a century-old border conflict. Over 1,300 square 
kilometres were flooded to create Itaipu’s reservoir basin. This area included the Guaíra 
waterfalls themselves, meaning that the rising waters of Itaipu swallowed up the entire region 
around Porto Renato. After 100 years of geopolitical standoffs, Brazil and Paraguay had finally 
found a way to make their border conflict literally disappear. As Brazil’s Foreign Ministry 
described in a confidential report: the dam ‘should flood the entire disputed zone, and as such, 
would finally resolve this problem’.113 
Over the course of the Guaíra border crisis, the Southern Cone’s geopolitical compass 
tilted dramatically. During the infancy of Brazil’s dictatorship, its leaders stood firm against the 
demands of both Paraguay and Argentina, allowing the Brazilian regime to bolster its standing 
throughout the region. By seeking to fulfil the development ideologies of its Doctrine of National 
Security—and with the support of the U.S. government—the Brazilian dictatorship gained 
control of both the waters of the Paraná River, and the lands of eastern Paraguay. This process 
not only brought Paraguay into Brazil’s sphere of power, but it simultaneously minimized the 
influence of Argentina. And although Paraguay was marginalised by the stigma of being a 
secondary nation stuck in Brazil’s shadow, the government’s actions at Guaíra guaranteed that it 
would benefit greatly from new sources of hydroelectric energy.  
The Guaíra border standoff was one of the most significant events in the formation of 
Latin America’s current geopolitical landscape. Along with enabling the construction of the 
Itaipu dam, this process catalysed Brazil’s ascent as the Southern Cone’s major power. Rooted in 
the legacies of the War of the Triple Alliance, the conflict was reanimated a century later by the 
ambitions of two military regimes in the throes of Latin America’s Cold War. For fifteen months 
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between 1965 and 1966, the governments of Brazil and Paraguay attempted to defend their 
national sovereignty in a tense frontier zone. Each regime mobilised troops along the border, 
invoked the spectre of war, and did everything it could to stake a claim to the hydroelectric 
potential of the Paraná River. When the dust settled, Brazil had secured almost complete control 
of the eventual Itaipu project, and was well on its way to becoming the region’s most powerful 
nation. On the 50th anniversary of this momentous—yet almost entirely overlooked—episode in 
Latin American history, revisiting the Brazil-Paraguay border crisis unearths the forgotten roots 
of the Itaipu dam while shedding new light on the geopolitics of the Southern Cone. 
